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Mobile crowdsensing allows data collection at a scale and pace that was once impossible. One of the biggest
challenges in mobile crowdsensing is that participants may exhibit malicious or unreliable behavior. Therefore,
it becomes imperative to design algorithms to accurately classify between reliable and unreliable sensing
reports. To this end, we propose a novel Framework for optimizing Information Reliability in Smartphone-
based participaTory sensing (FIRST), that leverages mobile trusted participants (MTPs) to securely assess
the reliability of sensing reports. FIRST models and solves the challenging problem of determining before
deployment the minimum number of MTPs to be used in order to achieve desired classification accuracy. We
extensively evaluate FIRST through an implementation in iOS and Android of a room occupancy monitoring
system, and through simulations with real-world mobility traces. Experimental results demonstrate that FIRST
reduces significantly the impact of three security attacks (i.e., corruption, on/off, and collusion), by achieving
a classification accuracy of almost 80% in the considered scenarios. Finally, we discuss our ongoing research
efforts to test the performance of FIRST as part of the National Map Corps project.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed the proliferation of smartphones in people’s daily lives; interest-
ingly, today’s smartphones are equipped with a set of cheap but powerful embedded sensors, such
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as accelerometer, digital compass, gyroscope, GPS, microphone, and camera. The pervasiveness of
smartphones coupled with a near-ubiquitous wireless network infrastructure can thus be leveraged
to sense, collect, and analyze data far beyond the scale of what was once possible, without the
need to deploy thousands of static sensors. This new paradigm is commonly referred to as mobile
crowdsensing (MCS) [18]. Realizing its great potential, many researchers have developed various
applications based on this paradigm, including road traffic monitoring [13, 14, 46], information
sharing [6, 17], environmental and crime monitoring [4, 5, 39], just to name a few.
Motivations and Challenges. The inherent collaborative nature of MCS implies that its success
is strictly dependent on the reliability of the information sent by the participants. On the other
hand, it is well recognized that participants may voluntarily submit unreliable information. For
instance, participants may be maliciously aimed at degrading the received service to the other users
of the application by conducting security attacks. In March 2014, to give an example, students from
Technion-Israel Institute of Technology successfully simulated through GPS spoofing a traffic jam
on Waze that lasted hours, causing thousands of motorists to deviate from their routes [3]. These
(and similar) attacks are made extremely easy by smartphone applications (apps) like LocationHolic
or FakeLocation [28], which allow participants to spoof their current GPS location. A second reason
to submit false information is to obtain an unfair advantage with respect to other users (e.g., rewards
obtained without actually doing any sensing service) [35]. In other words, such unreliable behavior
may lead to the degradation of the information quality (IQ) contained in sensing reports.
Table 1 summarizes a list of apps in which malicious participants may obtain an advantage by
submitting unreliable information.
Application Type Unfair Advantages
Foursquare Location Review Badges and points received withoutactually checking-in at locations.
Ingress Social Game Getting score and level unfairlyclaiming not visited locations.
Shopkick Store Review Received rewards for reviewsof stores not visited.
Uber Car Trip Finder
Drivers can increase the odd of
being called faking their location
in points of interest (airport, train
station, etc.)
Waze Traffic Monitoring Getting points through fake travels.
Table 1. Summary of unfair advantages in MCS apps.
Recognizing the crucial importance of addressing the issue of improving the IQ level in mobile
crowdsensing, the research community has recently proposed a number of solutions to address
this issue [20, 29, 31, 40, 44, 45]. Most of prior work improves the IQ by designing classification
algorithms able to accurately discriminate between unreliable and reliable sensing reports. To help
in this process, the most popular strategy is to use reputation and trust frameworks [7], which
estimate the reliability of sensing reports by keeping track of participants’ reliability over time. The
reader may refer to our recent survey paper [41] for more information on the topic of IQ in MCS
and how it has been tackled in prior work. The issue with existing solutions is that they strongly
rely on easy-to-manipulate factors to update the reputation scores, such as participants’ location or
mobility pattern [31, 44], or consensus-based techniques such as majority voting [20]. Thus, these
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approaches may not be effective when a significant number of participants are malicious (i.e., they
deliberately submit false information).
To ease the impact of malicious and/or unreliable participants, a limited number ofmobile trusted
participants (MTPs) may be employed to help build reputation scores in a secure manner, and
thus ‘bootstrap’ the trust in the system [7]. Specifically, MTPs are participants that are hired by
the sensing application to periodically generate reliable reports that reflect the actual status of
the event that is being monitored around their location. This methodology is being successfully
used in the National Map Corps project [32] developed by the U.S. Department of Geographical
Survey (USGS), where MTPs (in this case, USGS employees) are employed to validate crowdsourced
data, such as the exact location of schools and cemeteries (website at http://nationalmap.gov/
TheNationalMapCorps/). MTPs are also used in the Crowd Sourcing Rangeland Conditions project
[23], where Kenyan pastoralists are recruited as MTPs by researchers to validate sensed data
regarding local vegetation conditions. The advantage given by MTPs is the capability to tackle
malicious and unreliable behavior by building reliable reputation scores. However, MTPs also
inevitably represent an additional cost for the MCS system, as MTPs need to be recruited.
In this paper, we aim at answering the following questions: what is the minimum number of
MTPs we need to employ to ensure that the system will achieve a certain classification accuracy? How
does the mobility of the MTPs affect the optimum number of MTPs needed? What is the impact of
non-trivial security attacks, such as on/off and collusion, on the classification accuracy?
There are several issues that need to be tackled to answer these questions. For example, for-
malizing the relationship between the number of MTPs deployed and the resulting classification
accuracy is significantly complex, since the latter is heavily influenced by the mobility of MTPs and
other users. Formalizing such relationship before the deployment of the MCS system is even more
challenging, due to the fact that mobility information may often be unknown a priori.
Contributions. These questions motivated our work and the following novel contributions.
(1) We mathematically formulate the MTP Optimization Problem (MOP), which aims at minimiz-
ing the number of MTPs deployed (to minimize hiring costs) while guaranteeing the desired
accuracy in classifying the collected reports as reliable or unreliable;
(2) We propose a novel Framework to optimize Information Reliability in Smartphone-based
participaTory sensing (FIRST), which has three main components. A probabilistic model,
called Computation of Validation Probability (CVP), calculates the probability that a user
report undergoes validation as a function of the number of MTPs deployed and user mobility.
A novel image processing algorithm, named Likelihood Estimation Algorithm (LEA), leverages
geographical constraints of the sensing area to provide an approximation of the probability
that a sensing report will be validated. Finally, an optimization algorithm (MOA) efficiently
solves the MOP by using the results from CVP and LEA, and computes the minimum number
of MTPs to achieve desired classification accuracy;
(3) We extensively evaluate the performance of FIRST by considering a mobile crowdsensing
(MCS) application for monitoring road traffic implemented with real mobility traces [2, 38, 49].
For comparison purpose, we also implemented [20, 40]. To test their performance, we consider
three security attacks, namely corruption, on/off, and collusion attack [35]. Our experimental
results demonstrate that FIRST outperforms the state of the art and achieves high classification
accuracy, and is able to tackle effectively all the three attacks considered in this paper;
(4) We further evaluate the performance of FIRST on a practical implementation of a mobile
crowdsensing (MCS) system, which was conducted at the IEEE PerCom 2015 conference.
In this experiment, we designed an app (for both iOS and Android devices), which was
distributed to the interested participants (i.e., volunteers) at the conference. These volunteers
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sent reports regarding the conference participation, acting as users of the MCS system. Results
show that FIRST outperforms previous approaches [20, 40] and achieves on the average a
high classification accuracy of about 80%, which accounts for an improvement of about 20%.
Paper Organization. This paper is organized as follows. Related work is summarized in Section
2, while Section 3 introduces the system architecture and describes the concept of MTP. Section 4
presents the proposed FIRST framework and its three components. Section 5 presents the experi-
mental results, while Section 6 draws conclusions and discusses ongoing work in collaboration
with the USGS.
2 RELATEDWORK
Recently, the information quality (IQ) problem in mobile crowdsensing (MCS) systems has attracted
a tremendous attention from the research community, and is expected to gain additional momentum
as MCS systems become more and more pervasive. We refer the reader to our recent paper [41], in
which we extensively survey existing work and research challenges in this field.
Related work on IQ in MCS can be divided into two main approaches: trusted platform modules
(TPMs) and reputation-based systems. TPMs are hardware chips that reside on the participants’
devices, and ensure that the sensed data is captured by authentic and authorized sensor devices
within the system [12, 16, 42]. The main drawback of this approach is that TPMs require additional
hardware not currently available on off-the-shelf devices, implying such solutions are not readily
deployable. Moreover, TPM chips are tailored to verify data coming from physical sensors (e.g.,
accelerometer, camera). Thus, they are not applicable to MCS systems in which the information is
directly supplied by the participants.
Most of related work has focused on developing reputation-based systems to increase information
reliability [35]. Specifically, they associate each user with a reputation level, which is estimated
and updated over time. Among related work, [20, 29, 40, 44] are the most relevant. In [44], the
authors proposed ARTsense, a reputation-based framework that includes a privacy-preserving
provenance model, a data trust assessment scheme, and an anonymous reputation management
protocol. The main issue of [44] is that user reputation is updated by considering contextual factors,
such as location and time constraints. Given user location and timestamp of reports are easily
forgeable quantities, the solution proposed in [44] may not perform well in practical MCS systems,
where malicious users may voluntarily tamper with their GPS location and timestamp of reports.
Recently, in [20] the authors proposed a reputation framework which implements an improved
version of majority vote. The main limitations of this framework are (i) the assumption of constant
sampling rate, which is not realistic in asynchronous MCS systems, and (ii) the poor resilience to
a large number of malicious users, as the framework uses a modified version of majority vote to
update user reputation levels. To overcome such limitation, in [40] the authors proposed FIDES, a
reputation-based framework that used mobile security agents (concept that inspired our MTPs in
this paper) to classify sensing reports. Similarly to us, FIDES is also resilient to a large number of
malicious users. However, as in [20], the necessity to set a significant number of parameters makes
the actual performance of the framework hardly predictable in reality. On the other hand, FIRST
does not depend on specific parameters.
A number of frameworks aimed to recruit participants in order to maximize the coverage of the
sensing area have been recently proposed [25, 27, 43, 47, 50, 51]. In [25], the authors propose a frame-
work to ensure coverage of the collected data, localization of the participating smartphones, and
overall energy efficiency of the data collection process. Zhang et al. proposed in [50] CrowdRecruiter,
a framework that minimizes incentive payments by selecting a small number of participants while
still satisfying probabilistic coverage constraint. In [47], Xiong et al. proposed a framework aimed to
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maximize the coverage quality of the sensing task while satisfying the incentive budget constraint.
In [43], the authors formulate the problem of sensing given points of interest as a gamification
problem, and devise a heuristic algorithm for deriving the set of users to which requests are sent
and appropriate reward points for each request. Our approach is different because we rely on MTPs
to compute the trustworthiness of participants, which ultimately improves information quality
significantly.
3 PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
In this paper, we consider a mobile crowdsensing architecture (depicted in Figure 1) consisting
of a platform (MCSP) which can be accessed through 3G/4G or WiFi Internet connection. The
data collection process is as follows. First, participants download through common app markets
like Google Play or App Store the mobile crowdsensing app, which is responsible for handling data
acquisition, transmission, and visualization (step 1). Then, the MCSP sends (periodically or when
necessary) sensing requests through the cloud to registered participants (step 2). The participants
can answer such requests by submitting their sensed data (step 3), and eventually receive a reward
for their services (step 4). Hereafter, we will use the words “participant” and “user” interchangeably.
1
app
reception
time
2
sensing
request
3
sensed
data
4
$$$
MCSP
· · ·· · · · · ·
Participants
Fig. 1. System architecture.
As far as the sensing application is concerned, we consider a sensing system in which the
phenomenon being monitored is (i) quantifiable, (ii) dynamic (i.e., varies over time), and (iii)
not subject to personal opinion. This includes phenomena measurable with physical sensors, for
example, air/noise pollution levels [10], but also quantities such as occupancy level of parking lots
[36], gas prices [11], traffic events (e.g., car crashes and traffic jams) [46], and so on. Furthermore,
we assume that the range of the sensing quantity being monitored may be divided up into intervals
or categories, which are specific to the MCS application but are properly defined before deployment.
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For example, in a traffic monitoring application, a different category for each traffic event (e.g.,
“Car Crash”, “Road Closure”, “Traffic Jam", and so on), like in the Waze app [46], could be specified.
We define a sensing report as reliable if the quantity being reported falls into the interval the
phenomenon is currently in (or belongs to that category).
As far as the security assumptions are concerned, we consider the MCSP trustworthy in terms
of its functionality (such as user registration, issuing credentials, receiving, processing, and re-
distributing data). Furthermore, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation are assumed to be
addressed by using standard techniques such as cryptography and digital signatures.
In the following, we concentrate on tackling the inappropriate behavior of participants, and
assume they may exhibitmalicious or unreliable behavior; below, we define in details such behavior
models. In the following, we will assume users are identified by the MCSP by username and
password and some sort of user-unique information (e.g., credit card information), meaning no
sybil/rejoin attacks are possible.
• Malicious: These users are willingly interested in feeding unreliable reports to the system;
their purpose is to either creating a disservice to other users (e.g., fake road traffic lines [3]),
or gaining an unfair advantage w.r.t. other users.
• Unreliable: These users are not willingly submitting false information, but they still do it
because of malfunctioning sensors or incapability in performing the sensing task [40].
FIRST provides a general approach to determine the reliability of each user depending on his/her
behavior. We experimentally study in Section 5 three types of attacks, namely the corruption, on-off
and collusion attacks (previously defined in [35]), and prove that FIRST is able to quickly detect the
malicious behavior and discard unreliable reports. We would like to point out that hereafter we
will focus only on the issue of information reliability. Other threats, for example DoS-based attacks,
are out of the scope of this paper. Also, note that incentivizing users’ participation is out of the
scope of this paper; solutions such as [48] may be integrated.
3.1 Mobile Trusted Participants
In this paper, we take the same approach used by the successful National Map Corps [32] and
Crowd Sourcing Rangeland Conditions [23] projects, and use mobile trusted participants (MTPs) to
tackle the attacks described in the previous section. Specifically, MTPs are individuals who are
able and willing to submit regularly reliable reports regarding the phenomenon being monitored
or observed. These reports are used to validate users’ sensing reports coming from nearby, and
ultimately estimate the reliability of those participants. Such estimate is used to classify reports
generated where MTPs are currently not present, as explained in the next sections.
To allow mathematical formulation, we logically divide up the sensing area into S = {s1, . . . , sn }
sectors, which may have variable size and represent the sensing granularity of the application.
For example, in the gas price app, we can have one sector for each gas station. In an air pollution
monitoring application, a sector may be as large as a neighborhood of a city, whereas in a traffic
monitoring application, sectors may be as large as a city block. We also defineU = {u1, . . . ,uz } as
the set of users contributing to the sensing application.
We model the MTP report validation process as follows. In order to validate user reports, we
assume that the reports sent by MTPs are valid for a time period of T units. The value of T is
a system parameter that is dependent on the variance over time of the sensing quantity being
measured. For example, in a traffic monitoring application, a good value ofT could be 5-10 minutes,
while in a gas price monitoring app T can be much longer (in Section 5.2, we evaluate the impact
of T on the system performance).
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t = 0
3T
2T
MTP path
s1
s2
s3
Fig. 2. An MTP moving over the sensing area.
Definition 1. Validation of sensing reports. Whenever a sensing report q is received from a
user ui in sector sj , the platform checks whether a report from an MTP in sector sj was received in the
previous T time units. If yes, then the report is cross-checked with that coming from the MTP. If q is
reliable (i.e., falls into the range of the report sent by the MTP), q is marked as validated and classified
as reliable. Instead, q is rejected if unreliable. If q is not validated, it is classified reliable or unreliable
depending on an algorithm discussed in Section 4.
Figure 2 illustrates an example in which an MTP is moving over a sensing area comprising three
sectors. The locations at which the MTP submits a sensing report are marked by a human figure,
while users are depicted as black dots. The user reports from sector s1 between t = 0 and T units
are validated by using the MTP report sent at t = 0. Meanwhile, the MTP moves to sector s2 and
generates a new report at time 2T , which then validates users reports from sector s2 in the next
time window. Similarly, the MTP report at 3T validates the user reports from sector s3 in the time
interval [2T , 3T ].
Examples of MTPs in urban sensing scenarios include, but are not limited to, professional drivers
(i.e., taxi/bus), policemen, employees of the MCS application, or people commuting on a daily basis
to their workplace. Henceforth, we will consider the MTPs as reliable, in sense that it is implied that
their reports reflects the actual status of the event being monitored. This also implies that reports
originating from the same sector during the same time window are supposed to be equivalent. The
case in which trusted participants can be (up to some extent) unreliable has already been studied
[40]. Since we believe that assuming perfectly controllable MTP mobility may not be realistic in
real-world urban sensing scenarios, hereafter we will assume the MTP mobility as not controllable.
3.2 MTP Optimization Problem
It is intuitive that the number of validated sensing reports (and therefore, information reliability)
increases as the number of recruited MTPs increases. However, in practical implementations, we
cannot assume unconstrained budget to recruit MTPs; the number of MTPs that can be used by
the system will be limited and therefore, insufficient to guarantee perfect information reliability.
To this end, we define the MTP Optimization Problem (MOP). Before that, we define the metric of
classification accuracy. Table 2 summarizes the main symbols used in the following mathematical
analysis.
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Symbol Description
X Complement of event X
R/R Event of the system considering a report as reliable/unreliable
E Event of classification error
V /V Event of report validation/non-validation
P{E} Classification error
F /F Event of a report being unreliable/reliable
ϵmax Desired maximum classification error probability
Q Set of MTPs
U Set of users/participants
S Set of sectors
u (i; t , z) Probability of user i being in sector z at time t
q(i; t , z) Probability of MTP i being in sector z at time t
Table 2. Summary of main symbols.
Definition 2. Classification Error. Let R define the event of the system considering a report
as reliable, and let F define the event of a user submitting an unreliable sensing report. Let E define
the event of erroneously deeming reliable (resp. unreliable) an unreliable (resp. reliable) report. By
definition, it follows that the probability of event E, denoted P{E}, can be computed as
P{E} = P{F } · P{R | F } + P{F } · P{R | F } (1)
where X is defined as the complement of event X . Thus, 1 − P{E} represents the classification
accuracy of the MCS system.
Let ϵmax be the desired maximum classification error probability that the MCS system is able to
tolerate. The MTP optimization problem (MOP) is then defined as follows.
Definition 3. MTP Optimization Problem.
Minimizem such that P{E} ≤ ϵmax □
Discussions. In Section 4.3, we discuss how the P{F } quantity can be estimated to solve the MOP.
The P{F } takes into account that users may sometimes inadvertently send unreliable information
while performing the sensing tasks (e.g., sending blurred pictures by mistake), as well as malicious
behavior. Note also that P{E} is defined on the reports that have been submitted by participants
and have not been validated. Furthermore, having a significant validation probability P{V } does
not make the validated reports useless, but instead that may help increase the information quality
level of the mobile crowdsensing system. Indeed, although being validated, these sensing reports
may differ between each other to some extent. For example, in a gas price monitoring application,
the gas prices reported by four users could be $2.10, $2.45, $2.47 and $2.25 but all belonging to
the interval [$2, $2.5]. Regardless, a single value has to be obtained from these reports in order to
be used by the system and the participants. To this end, a truth discovery algorithm can be used
to merge the different data coming from the participants and thus obtain a more reliable result
regarding the event being monitored, which ultimately benefits the information quality level of the
system.
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4 THE FIRST FRAMEWORK
In this section, we propose the FIRST framework. Figure 3 illustrates the main components of the
framework, defined as follows.
Sensing area map
Likelihood
Estimation
Algorithm
(LEA)
Computation of
Validation
Probability
(CVP)
MTP
Optimization
Algorithm
(MOA)
Minimum number
of MTPs
(MOP solution)
ℓ˜
Fig. 3. Block scheme of the FIRST framework.
• Likelihood Estimation Algorithm (LEA): It provides an approximation of the mobility of
users and MTPs. LEA is based on an image processing technique that produces an approximate
likelihood based only on geographical information (i.e., the map of the sensing area).
• Computation of Validation Probability (CVP): This component derives the probability
P{V } of the event V that a sensing report will be validated by at least one MTP, as a function
of the number of MTPs deployed and the approximate mobility produced by the LEA.
• MTP Optimization Algorithm (MOA): It takes P{V } and computes P{E}, so as to provide
a solution to the MOP to achieve desired maximum error ϵmax .
For better clarity, we first describe the CVP component of FIRST assuming that we have the actual
mobility distribution (Section 4.1). Then, we explain how to obtain an approximate distribution of
mobility by using the LEA when the mobility is unknown (Section 4.2). Finally, we describe the
MOA, and discuss how FIRST is implemented in real-world MCS systems (Section 4.3).
4.1 Computation of Validation Probability
In this section, we derive the probability P{V } of the event that a sensing report will be validated
by at least one MTP. Let Q be the set of MTPs competing for offering their sensing services, and
U be the set of users of the application. Let u (i; t , z) be the distribution over the sector set S of
the random variable (r.v.) U tz describing the location of user z at time t . Let also q(i; t , z) be the
distribution over the sector set S of the random variable (r.v.) Qtz describing the location of MTP z
at time t . The notation x (a;b) means that the distribution named x is expressed as a function of
the a variable and is parametrized by the variable b.
Let us calculate the probability P{Vz | U zt = si } that a sensing report coming from user uz
undergoes validation by an MTP, conditioned to the fact that user uz is currently in sector si of the
sensing area:
P{Vz | U zt = si } = 1 −
∏
k ∈Q
(1 − q(i; t ,k )) (2)
In the above equation, we assume that the mobility of each MTP is independent, which is sound
because it is highly unlikely MTPs would influence each other’s mobility in any way. The above
equation can be explained as follows. The probability that a sensing report undergoes validation is
the complement of the probability that no MTP is in the same sector as the user. The probability
that a sensing report undergoes validation, irrespective of the location of the user, can thus be
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: December 2017.
1:10 F. Restuccia et al.
computed by using the theorem of total probability, i.e.,
P{Vz } =
n∑
i=1
P{Vz | U zt = si } · u (i; t , z) (3)
The probability P{V } that on the average a sensing report will be validated can be computed as the
average P{Vz } over all the users, which is
P{V } = 1|U |
|U |∑
z=1
P{Vz } (4)
The probability P{V } that a sensing report will be validated by at least one MTP is assuming
that users may have different mobility distributions P{Vz }. Therefore, if information regarding the
mobility of each user is available, it can be used to compute a more precise estimate of P{V }.
Example. Figure 4 shows two sensing areas (S1 and S2) divided into the same number n = 8
of sectors. We assume that a total ofm = 5MTPs are present. For simplicity, in this example we
assume that the mobilities of users and MTPs follow the same distribution and that all users follow
the same distribution.
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8 0
1
8 0
1
8 0
2
8
3
8
S1 S2
s1 s2 s1 s2
s8
s6
s4
s2
s7
s5
s3
s1
Fig. 4. Example to illustrate computation of P{V }.
For simplicity, let us define as ℓji as the probability that an MTP will be in sensing area j and
sector i . The corresponding mobility distributions ℓ1i and ℓ2i are given as: ℓ1i = 1/8 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8,
while
ℓ2i =

1
8 i = 1, 3, 5
2
8 i = 7
3
8 i = 8
0 i = 2, 4, 6
(5)
Let us compute P{V } for both sensing areas. First, we need to compute P{V | U = si } for each si ,
which is
• S1 : P{V | U = si } = 1− (1− 1/8)5 = 0.49 for every i , since ℓi is equal for each sector. Therefore,
P{V } = 1/8 · 8 · 0.49 = 0.49.
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• S2 : P{V | U = s1} = P{V | L = s3} = P{V |U = s5} = 1 − (1 − 1/8)5 = 0.49. P{V | U = s7} =
1 − (1 − 2/8)5 = 0.76, P{V | U = s8} = 1 − (1 − 3/8)5 = 0.90, P{V | U = s2} = P{V | U = s4} =
P{V | U = s6} = 0. Therefore, P{V } = 3/8 · 0.49 + 2/8 · 0.76 + 3/8 · 0.90 = 0.71.
4.2 Likelihood Estimation Algorithm
Estimating the mobility distributionsu and q is paramount to compute P{V } and therefore, provide a
cost-efficient solution to the MOP. In cases where information about the mobility of users and MTPs
is available, for example, mobility traces of MTPs and users are available, an exact computation of
u and q may be used. However, prior mobility information may not always be available.
In this paper, we developed a heuristic Likelihood Estimation Algorithm (LEA) to provide a tighter
bound on the mobility of users and MTPs, with just knowing the sensing area location. This
heuristic is based on the following rationale: the MCS systems we are considering are deployed
in cities, or anyway close to urban areas. This implies that the mobility of users and MTPs will
be likely to be almost restricted to the main arterial roads of the sensing areas, or anyway the
zones/roads with the greater amount of traffic (both pedestrian and vehicular). By restricting the
possible area of movement of the MTPs and users, we are able to reduce the randomness of the
movement of users and MTPs, and therefore, provide a tighter bound on the likelihood of sectors.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. (a) Heatmap of traces vs. (b) Arterial roads.
Let us now describe the LEA algorithm which works as follows. We consider the map M
of the sensing area, and divide it into n sectors as required by the application, where S =
{s1, · · · , sn } is the set of sectors. Then, information about the most popular places (which may
be roads/squares/buildings) and the geographical constraints of the sensing area is acquired. By
using Google Maps APIs, we highlight the main arterial roads on a specific location area. This
information is leveraged to mark such places in the map M , the background of which is further
removed to get a black-and-white image of the sensing area as shown in Figure 5(b), where the
black pixels represent the popular places.
The LEA is described by the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1. In Section 5, we show that the LEA
is remarkably effective in approximating the mobility distribution of users in various settings, by
using real-world mobility traces collected in three major cities in three different continents, namely
Rome, San Francisco and Beijing.
Discussions. The implicit assumptions that LEA makes are (i) the mobility of users and MTPs
is stationary (i.e., does not change over time, thus are dispersal); and (ii) users and MTPs follow
the same mobility distributions. We also would like to point out that we have used the Google
Maps Traffic application programming interfaces (APIs) [21] as our source of information for roads
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ALGORITHM 1: Likelihood Estimation Algorithm (LEA)
Input: M , map of the sensing area
Output: ℓ˜, approximate distribution of mobility
1: S ← set of sectors s1 · · · sn
2: I ← processed image with most popular areas
3: B ← 0 (sum of black pixels in sensing area)
4: for each sector si ∈ S do
5: Bi ← number of black pixels ∈ si
6: B ← B + Bi
7: end for
8: for each si ∈ S do
9: ℓ˜(i ) ← Bi/B
10: end for
11: return ℓ˜
popularity. By using this API, it is possible to obtain a map highlighting the most popular roads of
a city (called in Google Maps “arterial roads”) according to usual volume of traffic. Unfortunately,
the APIs of Google Maps are proprietary and thus it is not possible to access individual numeric
data regarding the popularity of a particular road or geographical area. Thus, we have designed a
heuristic algorithm based on the images provided by Google Maps to approximate the popularity of
each road, and thus of each sector. On the other hand, LEA is not tied to a particular map application,
and other approaches, such as Open Street Maps [15], could be also used.
Although we recognize that LEA undertakes pretty strong assumptions, in the experimental
evaluation conducted in Section 5 we show that LEA provides a pretty good approximation of the
likelihood of the sectors, considering that we are using information only from a map. Indeed, we
don’t claim LEA is a fine-grained mobility estimation algorithm. Instead, it is a simple heuristic
that provides before deployment an approximate information regarding the likelihood of certain
sectors with respect to others. If more reliable information about the mobility is known, it could be
used to complement LEA’s analysis and achieve better optimization results. Indeed, another (more
accurate) MOP solution could be calculated once the system has been deployed and we have more
reliable information on the participants’ mobility.
4.3 Solving the MTP Optimization Problem
Let us now describe the methodology adopted by FIRST to solve the MTP Optimization Problem
(MOP) defined in Section 3.2. The first step is to compute the error probability P{E}. This implies
we need to derive P{R | F } and P{R | F }, defined in Equation (1), as a function of P{V }.
Since in Equation (4) we have shown how to compute P{V } given q and u, we now need to apply
probability theory to derive these quantities. The P{E} quantity depends on P{R | F } and P{R | F },
which in turn depend on the quantities P{R ∩ F } and P{R ∩ F }. First, P{R ∩ F } is derived through
the following steps:
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P{R ∩ F } =
:0
P{R ∩ F | V } · P{V } + P{R ∩ F | V } · P{V } (6a)
=
P{R ∩ F ∩V }
P{V }
·P{V } = (6b)
= P{R ∩V } · P{F } = (6c)
= P{R | V } · P{V } · P{F } (6d)
The elimination of the quantity P{R ∩ F | V } in Equation (6a) is due to the fact that the system
does not deem a report reliable when it has been validated and marked as unreliable, thus, the event
has probability of occurring equal to zero. Next, the conclusion that P{R∩F |V } = P{R∩F∩V } ·1/P{V }
in Equation (6b) and P{R ∩V } = P{V } · P{R | V } in Equation (6d), respectively, follow the definition
of conditional probability [26]. Finally, Equation (6d) follows from the independence of events
R ∩V and F . Specifically, the fact that a report is accepted while not validated, which is, the R ∩V
event, does not depend on the report being actually reliable or not, which is, the F event. This is
due to the fact that the system has no knowledge that the report is actually reliable when making
an acceptance or rejection decision. Next, the probability P{R ∩ F } is derived as follows:
P{R ∩ F } =
:P{F }
P{R ∩ F | V } · P{V } + P{R ∩ F | V } · P{V } = (7a)
= P{F } · P{V } + P{R ∩ F ∩V }
P{V }
·P{V } = (7b)
= P{F } · P{V } + P{R ∩V } · P{F } = (7c)
= P{F } · P{V } + P{V } · P{F } · P{R | V } = (7d)
= P{F } · (P{V } + P{V } · P{R | V }) (7e)
In Equation (7a), it is observed that P{R ∩ F | V } = P{F }. This is because, if a report has been
validated, the acceptance of the report depends only on the fact that the report is reliable or not,
which happens with probability P{F }. Similar to Equation (6), Equations (7b) and (7d) follow from
the definition of conditional probability, and Equation (7c) follows from the independence of events
R ∩V and F .
We can now derive P{R | F } and P{R | F } from Equations (6) and (7), as reported below. P{R | F }
is derived from P{R ∩ F } as follows, by applying the definition of conditional probability:
P{R | F } = P{R ∩ F }
P{F } (8)
Next, P{R | F } is derived from P{R ∩ F } as follows:
P{R | F } = 1 − P{R | F } (9a)
= 1 − P{R ∩ F }
P{F } (9b)
Equation (9a) follows from the fact that the events (R | F ) and (R | F ) are complementary; thus,
P{R | F }+P{R | F } = 1. Equation (9b) is derived by applying the definition of conditional probability.
The quantity P{R | V }, which is the probability to deem a report reliable when not validated by
MTPs, mathematically models the rationale that FIRST employs when making a decision regarding
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the reliability/unreliability of a non-validated report. To this end, FIRST leverages validated data
fromMTPs to infer the “trustworthiness” level of a user, and uses this quantity to infer the reliability
of sensing reports coming from that user. The rationale is that, if the user has behaved correctly
in the past, i.e., most of her validated reports were reliable, then it is likely that such user will be
reliable in the future. FIRST implements this rationale by using the Jøsang’s trust model [24]. We
used this trust model since it has been widely adopted and accepted as a reliable and effective way
to mathematically model trustworthiness in a variety of fields [35]. For the sake of simplicity, as
stated in Section 4.2, in the analytical model we have assumed that the users follow the same P{V }
and P{F } probability distributions. Consequently, P{R | V } is computed as
P{R | V } =
belief component︷        ︸︸        ︷
P{V } · P{F } +
uncertainty component︷    ︸︸    ︷
1/2 · P{V } (10)
This formula implements the Jøsang’s trust model as follows. The first part, P{V } · P{F }, represents
the belief component of the users trustworthiness level – it is higher when users are validated most
of the time (i.e., P{V } close to 1) and the reports are reliable. The second part, 1/2 · P{V }, represents
the uncertainty component of the users trustworthiness level – it is higher when most of the reports
have not been validated. Note that, as P{V } increases, the value of P{R | V } approximates to P{F }.
Also, if P{V } = 0, the system deems as reliable every report with probability 1/2 (coin tossing), which
is sound as there is no reason to be more inclined to accept or reject the report if no information is
available [22].
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Fig. 6. Number of MTPs vs. P{F }.
Discussions. An initial value of the probability P{F } is needed in order to solve the MTP
optimization problem (MOP). To investigate this aspect, we have run experiments to evaluate
the impact of P{F } on the number of MTPs needed to obtain a given classification error. Figure 6
depicts the number of MTPs needed as a function of P{F }, for three values of desired maximum
error probability ϵmax . Figure 6 shows that, irrespective of ϵmax , the highest number of MTPs is
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necessary when P{F } = 0.5. These results confirm the intuition that the worst case in terms of
number of MTPs is when the participants are most unpredictable, i.e., they could send a reliable or
unreliable report with the same probability. Therefore, we conlcude that P{F } = 0.5 is the value
that has be chosen to initially run the MOP, as it represents the worst-case scenario. We point out
that an a priori estimation of P{F } is only used to provide a reasonable approximation (through the
MOP) of the number of MTPs that will be needed to achieve the desired classification accuracy.
On the other hand, the value of P{F } may change over time (e.g., a participant is malicious and/or
unreliable) and it is different for each user. For this reason, after deployment, FIRST estimates the
value of P{F } for each participant on the run, as explained in Section 4.4. Although the P{F } quantity
is assumed to be constant in the analytical model to simplify the mathematical optimization, we
study the resiliency of the system to complex attacks like on/off attack and collusion attack in
Section 5.1.2, where we also show that the validated data from MTPs can be used to estimate P{F }
and thus re-run the MOP to decrease the number of MTPs over time.
Optimization Algorithm.We are now ready to present an algorithm to solve the MOP, called
the MOP Optimization Algorithm (MOA). The MOA is based on a modified version of binary search
algorithm, called Left-most Insertion Point (LMIP). More specifically, LMIP returns the left-most
place (i.e., the minimum value) where P{E} can be correctly inserted (and still maintains the sorted
order) in the ordered array of the errors corresponding to a particular choice ofm. This corresponds
to the lower (inclusive) bound of the range of elements that are equal to the given value (if any).
Note that LMIP can be applied to solve the MOP due to the fact that P{E} is a monotonically
decreasing function ofm. This is because the product component of the quantity P{Vz | U zt = si } in
Equation (2) increases withm (i.e., the cardinality of set Q increases). Consequently, more reports
are validated by MTPs, which ultimately leads to a lesser P{E}.
The MOA takes as input the approximate distribution ℓ˜i provided by LEA (equal for participants
and MTPs), and also P{F }, the desired maximum error ϵmax , and the maximum numbermmax of
MTPs available. It provides as output the optimum numberm∗ of MTPs to be used to achieve the
desired maximum error ϵmax .
ALGORITHM 2: MOP Optimization Algorithm (MOA)
Input: ℓ˜i , P{F }, ϵmax ,mmax
Output: m∗
1: ϵmin ← CalculateError(ℓ˜i ,P{F },mmax )
2: if ϵmax < ϵmin then
3: return ‘infeasible’
4: end if
5: return LMIP(ℓ˜i , P{F }, ϵmax , 0,mmax )
Let us calculate the time complexity of the MOA. LMIP is a variation of binary search, therefore
its overall complexity will be O (x · logmmax ), where x is the complexity of CalculateError. It
requires constant time to compute P{E} using Equation (1) and n ·m · p iterations to compute
P{V } using Equation (4), where n, m, and p are the number of sectors, MTPs and participants,
respectively. However, when using LEA, we are assuming that users and MTPs follow the same
mobility distributions. Thus, Equation (4) can be computed in Θ(n), and the overall time complexity
of MOA is given by O (n · logmmax ).
Example 3. In the example of Figure 7, we assume the ℓ distribution equal to ℓ2i presented in
Figure 4, P{F } = 0.01,mmax = 8 and ϵmax = 0.1. In this case, the LMIP will returnm∗ = 4, since it
is the left-most element that provides P{E} ≤ 0.1.
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ALGORITHM 3: Left-most Insertion Point (LMIP)
Input: ℓ˜i , P{F }, ϵmax , i , j
Output: m∗
1: if j < i then
2: return i
3: end if
4: mid ← ⌊ (i + j )/2⌋
5: if CalculateError(ℓ˜i ,P{F },mid ) ≤ ϵmax then
6: return LMIP(ℓ˜i , P{F }, ϵmax , i ,mid − 1)
7: else
8: return LMIP(ℓ˜i , P{F }, ϵmax ,mid + 1, j)
9: end if
0.29 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
P{E}
m
Fig. 7. Example of LMIP.
4.4 FIRST Classification Algorithm
Algorithm 4 reports in details the procedure that FIRST adopts to classify reports as reliable
(R) or unreliable (U). For each user ui , the system keeps track of the number ki of sensing reports
submitted by the user, the number kvi of sensing reports validated by an MTP, and the number kri
of reports that have been validated as reliable.
ALGORITHM 4: FIRST Classification Algorithm for Sensing Reports
Input: Sensing report qi from user ui
Output: Classification result - reliable (R) or unreliable (U)
1: ki ← 0, kvi ← 0, kri ← 0 ∀i
2: for each report qi do
3: ki ← ki + 1
4: if qi has been validated then
5: kvi ← kvi + 1
6: if qi is deemed reliable then
7: kri ← kri + 1
8: return R
9: else
10: return U
11: end if
12: end if
13: if qi has not been validated then
14: T (ui ) =
kri
ki
+ 12 ·
(
1 − k
v
i
ki
)
15: P{qi = R | T (ui )} = T (ui )
16: P{qi = U | T (ui )} = 1 −T (ui )
17: return argmaxc ∈{R,U } P{qi = c | T (ui )}
18: end if
19: end for
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Let us define T (ui ) as the current trustworthiness level of user ui . As soon as a report qi is
received by user ui , the following steps take place. First, the quantity ki ← ki + 1. Then, if the
report has been validated, kvi ← kvi + 1. Next, if the report has been validated as reliable by an
MTP, (i) kri ← kri + 1; (ii) the classification result is R (line 8). Conversely, if the report has been
validated as non-reliable, classification result is U (line 10).
If qi has not been validated by an MTP, than the following steps take place. The trustworthiness
level T (ui ) is updated by using the following equation, which implements the Jøsang’s trust model
defined in Equation 10:
T (ui ) =
kri
ki
+
1
2 ·
(
1 − k
v
i
ki
)
∈ [0, 1] (11)
Then, FIRST uses a Bayes estimator classifier, defined as C : [0, 1]→ {R,U }, where T (ui ) is the
prior distribution. Bayes estimators are probabilistic classifiers [9], the same type of the well-known
Naïve Bayes classifier. Probabilistic classifiers define conditional distributions P{Y | X }, meaning
that for a given x ∈ X , they assign probabilities to all y ∈ Y (and these probabilities sum to one).
The “hard” classification (i.e., assigning the input to a specific output class) is done by selecting the
class which has the highest probability. Specifically, the output class C (qi ) is computed as follows:
C (qi ) = argmaxc ∈{R,U } P{qi = c | T (ui )}, (12)
where conditional probabilities are defined as follows: P{qi = R | T (ui )} = T (ui ) (line 15), and
P{qi = U | T (ui )} = 1−T (ui ) (line 16). In other words, the trustworthiness level of a user is directly
translated to the trustworthiness level of the report. After being classified as reliable, reports may
be subsequently analyzed by additional algorithms (for example, [33, 34]) to determine the actual
status of the sensing area by combining or fusing the information conveyed by the reliable reports.
Note that Algorithm 4 computes the reliability of each report qi in O(1) time.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the experimental results obtained by evaluating the performances
of FIRST and comparing it with relevant related work. First, we report the performance results
obtained by considering an application monitoring vehicular traffic events. Then, we discuss results
obtained by using the Participatory PerCom application.
5.1 Participatory Traffic Sensing
To implement this experiment, we considered mobility traces collected from the following datasets:
• CRAWDAD-SanFrancisco [38]: This dataset contains mobility traces of approximately 500
taxis in San Francisco, USA, collected over one month’s time;
• CRAWDAD-Rome [2]: In this dataset, 320 taxi drivers in the center of Rome were monitored
during March 2014;
• MSR-Beijing [49]: This dataset collected byMicrosoft Research Asia contains the GPS positions
of 10,357 taxis in Beijing during one month.
In these experiments, we consider a traffic sensing application in which taxi cab drivers re-
port traffic anomalies. We consider sensing areas of approximately 4×4km square areas, which
characterize the downtown of cities such as San Francisco, Rome, and Beijing. We implemented
the application using the OMNeT++ simulator (available at https://www.omnetpp.org). Anomaly
reports are binary (i.e., “there is/there is not a traffic anomaly in a particular sector”), and are
generated every five minutes through simulation. The probability of the report being is set to
P{F }, which varies according to the experiment being run. This allowed us to effectively emulate
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Fig. 8. Traces vs. Mobility Estimation Algorithm.
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a road traffic monitoring application. We point out that the following simulations are aimed at
validating the performance of the components of the FIRST framework and the resiliency against
the on/off, corruption and collusion attacks. In order to validate the FIRST framework with real-world
participants as well as real data, we have also conducted the Participatory PerCom experiment,
discussed in Section 5.2.
For pre-processing, we have first stored the traces belonging to the three different datasets into
the same format. We have also discretized the mobility of the taxi in sectors, according to the
topology described in the paper. Furthermore, we have defined a time window size of one minute.
At the beginning of each experiment, a portion of taxis is selected as MTPs and another portion as
the participants. If we need more taxis than the number of traces (such as in the Rome scenario),
we reuse the same traces for differents taxis. The starting point of each mobility trace is chosen
randomly for each experiment according to a uniform distribution. The mobility points that are
outside the sensing area are discarded.
5.1.1 Evaluation of FIRST components. We now evaluate the LEA and MOA components of the
FIRST framework. The goal of the first set of experiments is to test the efficacy of LEA in computing
the likelihood of sectors. To obtain ground-truth information about the actual mobility of taxi cabs,
we processed the traces using OMNeT++. We then ran the LEA algorithm to determine how well it
could approximate the true mobility statistics. To apply LEA, we have divided the sensing area into
a grid of 20×20 sectors, with sectors having the same size as a city block.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the likelihood of sectors and the one obtained by LEA,
respectively. More specifically, the figure shows the actual and estimated probability of a taxi to be
in each sector of the sensing area. Note that, for better clarity, the y-axis in Figure 8 is logarithmic,
and the quantities involved are very small (i.e., up to 10−4). Thus, these experiments conclude that
the LEA algorithm approximates well the likelihood of sectors, considering the scarce information
available. Figure 9 shows P{E} as a function of the MTPs per sector density, calculated analytically
by the Computation of Validation Probability (CVP) component of FIRST. For comparison purposes,
we evaluated CVP by providing as input (i) the distribution computed by LEA as applied to each
considered sensing area (CVP-LEA, represented by a dashed line), and (ii) the uniform mobility
distribution (CVP-Uniform, represented by a dotted continuous line) as the baseline approximation.
We compare such analytical results with the experiments using the traffic datasets.
As shown in Figure 9, in all three scenarios, CVP-LEA computes P{E} with remarkable precision.
In particular, the maximum difference obtained is 3.47%, achieved in the Rome setting. Furthermore,
Figure 9 shows that the accurate estimation of the mobility provided by the LEA translates into
an improved prediction accuracy of CVP w.r.t. the uniform distribution, as CVP-Uniform yields a
maximum difference of 17.02% in the case of Rome setting.
In Figure 10, we apply the MTP Optimization Algorithm (MOA) to analyze the MTPs per sector
density that is necessary by FIRST to provide maximum desired error probability ϵmax . Note that
the error probability has been experimentally calculated without including the reports coming
from MTPs and the reports that have not been validated. Similarly to the experiments shown in
Figure 9, we consider users sending unreliable reports with three probability values P{F } = 0.01, 0.5
and 0.9. These results highlight that FIRST is remarkably effective in achieving high accuracy with
a low number of MTPs. More specifically, it provides on the average 85% of accuracy with an MTPs
per sector density of about 32% in case of Rome and Beijing, and 55% in the case of San Francisco.
Note that higher accuracy values require in general a significant number of MTPs, especially
when the behavior of participants becomes hardly predictable (i.e., P{F } = 0.5) and the mobility is
highly entropic (i.e., in San Francisco setting). Somehow surprisingly, Figure 10 also shows that
fewer MTPs are needed when P{F } = 0.9 than when P{F } = 0.5. Intuitively, this is due to the fact
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Fig. 9. Number of MTPs / number of sectors vs Error Rate (P{E}).
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Fig. 10. MOA results.
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Fig. 12. On-off attack: Error Rate vs. On-off steps, MTPs, and attackers.
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that, when participants send reports randomly, it is more difficult to understand their reliability.
On the other hand, when their behavior is more “regular” (i.e., consistent over time) it is easier to
evaluate their reliability.
From Figures 9 and 10, we also conclude that San Francisco setting requires the most number of
of MTPs to achieve the same results obtained in the Rome and Beijing setting. This is because the
mobility of MTPs and participants is more concentrated there than in the San Francisco setting. For
example, as Figure 10 shows, San Francisco needs approximately 0.5 MTPs per sector to achieve an
error probability P{E} ≤ 0.1 with P{F } = 0.01, whereas to achieve the same result in Rome and
Beijing approximately 0.3 MTPs per sector are needed.
5.1.2 Evaluation of attack resiliency. Based on the behavior models defined in Section 3, in this
paper we take into account the following security attacks, which were defined in other domains
and recently cast in the context of mobile crowdsensing [35]. For simplicity, hereafter we will
generically use the word “attacker” for both malicious and unreliable users, and the words “threat”
and “attack” interchangeably.
(1) Corruption attack. This threat models the following strategy: for each sensing report, the
attacker sends unreliable data with probability p and correct data with probability 1 −p. This
attack can be carried out by unreliable and malicious users alike.
(2) On-off attack. In this attack, the malicious user alternates between normal and abnormal
behaviors to conceal her maliciousness. Specifically, the adversary periodically sendsn reliable
reports and thenm unreliable reports, and then repeats the process. This attack is extremely
easy to carry out but also extremely challenging to detect and contrast [1, 8, 37].
(3) Collusion attack. In this attack, two or more malicious participants coordinate their behavior
in order to provide the same (unreliable) information to the MCSP [19, 30]. The malicious
behavior may also include GPS location spoofing, so as to mislead the MCSP into assuming
colluding participants are nearby [40].
For comparison reasons, we implemented the FIDES framework [40], and the reputation-based
framework proposed in [20], hereafter referred to as [Huang 2014]. FIDES uses a modified version
of Jøsang’s trust model to update the reputation of users. This framework inherits from Jøsang’s
trust model a strong sensitivity to parameter tuning. On the other hand, [Huang 2014] proposes
an approach which is a improved variation of majority vote, and its performance also depends
on the choice of parameter setting (Gompertz’s function’s, among others). For implementation,
we used the parameter settings proposed in the papers, which are reported in Table 3. We also
implemented a pure majority vote scheme to obtain baseline performance. Even though Majority
and [Huang 2014] do not use MTPs directly, completely ignoring MTP reports for these systems
would not be a fair comparison. Thus, MTP reports were considered as normal users’ reports when
evaluating Majority and [Huang 2014]. If not stated otherwise, in the following experiments we
used the parameters reported in Table 3. Confidence intervals at 95% are shown only when above
1% of the value.
Figure 11 reports the error rate (i.e., the percentage of reports erroneously classified as reliable/not
reliable) obtained by the frameworks when subject to a corruption attack, as a function of the
(constant) attack probability, number of MTPs, and number of attackers. Figure 11(a) and (c) show
that the performance of Majority and [Huang 2014] decreases as the number of false reports and
attackers increases. This is reasonable, as both schemes are based on data aggregation and therefore
not resilient to large number of malicious users and/or unreliable reports. Furthermore, Figure 12
shows the results obtained under the On-off attack by all the considered schemes. As expected,
the performance of FIRST is slightly affected by this attack, especially when the percentage of
ON steps is less than the OFF one. This is because, the less the ON steps are, the harder it is for
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Fig. 13. Collusion attack: Error Rate vs. P{F }, MTPs, and attackers.
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Fig. 14. FIRST Acceptance probability P{R | V } in corruption, On-off, and Collusion attacks.
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Table 3. Experimental parameters.
Parameter Value
Experiment length 240mins
Timestep length 5mins
Location Rome
Number of users 2000
P{F } for non attackers 0.01
ar (FIDES) 0.7
au (FIDES) 0.9
Initial reputation (FIDES) 0.5
Reputation threshold (FIDES) 0.75
Initial weights (FIDES) [1, 0, 0]
λs (Huang) 0.7
λp (Huang) 0.8
a (Huang) 1
b (Huang) -2.5
c (Huang) -0.85
Initial reputation (Huang) 0.5
Reputation threshold (Huang) 0.5
Number of MTPs 400
Number of attackers 1200
Attackers P{F } 0.8
On-off steps (10, 10)
Collusion groups 3
FIRST to decrease the accept probability of malicious users. However, FIRST is able to achieve an
error rate of about 6% in the worst case. On the other side, [Huang 2014] and Majority are instead
more affected when the ON step is greater than the OFF, as it is more likely for them to misclassify
sensing reports when the percentage of unreliable reports/number of attackers is higher.
Figure 13 shows the results obtained by running the Collusion attack. The experiment has been
implemented as follows. We have assumed there are k collusion groups. An attacker belonging to
the k-th group coordinates with the other attackers belonging to the same group by implementing
together an On-off attack. In such attack, during the ON phase the attackers send false reports
pertaining to a chosen sector, the same for every user in the k-th group. The results conclude that
[Huang 2014] and Majority are severely affected by this attack, while FIRST tolerates well this
attack by keeping the error rate below 7% by using 400 MTPs, regardless of the number of attackers
and collusion groups considered. This is because FIRST uses MTPs to validate data and does not
rely on data aggregation. Interestingly enough, [Huang 2014] and Majority perform slightly well
when the collusion groups are more. This is explained by considering that when the collusion
groups are more, less attackers will belong to the same group, and so it is more likely that a scheme
based on aggregation may perform better.
In Figure 14 we report the probability P{R | V } of FIRST (i.e., the probability that a report will be
accepted when not validated) as a function of time, in all the considered attacks. In the Corruption
attack, as expected P{R | V } converges to the P{F } probability of the attackers. In the On-off attack,
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FIRST reacts by decreasing the P{R | V } probability and increasing it in the OFF phases. Same
behavior is also experimented in the Collusion attack, but in this case, the performance is not
affected by the number of attackers as explained above. As described in Section 4.3, P{R | V } is
equal to P {F }, because when reports are validated the probability of misclassification is zero; on
the other hand, when the reports are not validated, we would like that P{R | V } also tended to P{F },
and Figure 14 shows that FIRST achieves such goal.
1h 2h 3h 4h
Time
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Error Rate
Estimated P{F}
# MTPs per Sector
Fig. 15. Error Rate, Estimated P{F } and Number of MTPs per Sector vs time.
Although the MOP was designed to be run before deployment, the MOP may be re-run after
deployment by using an estimated P{F } value from the validated data to decrease the number of the
MTPs from the worst-case scenario (see the discussions in Section 4.3). To verify this intuition, we
have run experiments on the Rome mobility traces [2]. In these experiments, the target classification
accuracy of the MOP algorithm is 0.9. First, the MOP is run with P{F } = 0.5 to obtain the worst-case
value of the number of MTPs, as discussed in R1.(a). As the time goes by, P{F } is estimated every
five (5) minutes by using the validated reports as explained in Section 3.2. The new P{F } estimate
is then used to run the MOP again and thus decrease the number of MTPs employed. Figure 15
shows the error rate, the estimated P{F } value and the number of MTPs per sector as a function
of time. The figure shows that FIRST is able to use the estimated P{F } to decrease the number of
MTPs over time (from ∼0.65 to ∼0.4 per sector after seven (7) iterations) without compromising
the target classification accuracy (i.e., error rate of 0.1).
5.2 Participatory PerCom
In addition to the participatory traffic sensing use-case as described above, we have evaluated the
performance of FIRST by implementing an MCS system designed to monitor the attendance of
participants at various events during the IEEE PerCom 2015 conference held in St. Louis, Missouri,
USA. In such a system, the voluntary participants were asked to regularly submit (i) the conference
room they were currently in, and (ii) the (approximate) number of participants in that room. The
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goal of the experiment was to evaluate the accuracy of FIRST in classifying sensing reports sent by
participants in a practical scenario.
5.2.1 Experimental setup. The server-side of the MCS system handling the storage of sensing
reports was implemented by using a dedicated virtual machine on Amazon Web Services. Figure
16 shows the screenshots of the Android and iOS apps distributed to the participants1. The apps
provided a simple interface for the participants to report the room they were in (8 choices, from ‘A’
to ‘H’), and the approximate number of people in that room (5 choices, ‘Less than 10’, ‘Between
10 and 20’, ‘Between 20 and 50’, ‘Between 50 and 100’, and ‘More than 100’). In order to recruit
participants, we asked the conference and workshop attendees when they picked up registration
packages if they were willing to install our app and participate in the experimental study. This way,
we were able to recruit 57 participants attending the entire conference and workshops, which is
significant considering that we did not incentivize the participants with any kind of reward.
Fig. 16. Screenshots of the MCS app, Android and iOS.
If yes, they were asked to download and install our app through the DeployGate2 distribution
platform. the IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom),
held in St. Louis, Missouri, on March 23rd -27th , 2015.
In order to acquire ground-truth information about the location of participants, we used 20
Gimbal™ beacon devices (available at http://www.gimbal.com) which emitted periodically Bluetooth
packets that were received by the MCS app (deployment illustrated in Figure 17. Whenever a user
sent us a report, the location of the nearest beacon was also automatically included in the report
by the MCS app. This way, we were able to acquire ground-truth information on user location.
To acquire ground-truth information about the number of people in each room, three people
voluntarily acted as MTPs and sent every 5minutes the actual number of people in each conference
1IRB approval of experiments available on file upon request.
2Available at http://www.deploygate.com
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Fig. 17. Position of Bluetooth beacons.
room. Prior to the conference, to evaluate the impact of the T parameter (i.e., MTP reporting
interval), we implemented 5 concurrent, real-time classification processes, each one taking into
account different MTP reporting intervals (10, 15, 20, 25, and 40 minutes), aiming at evaluating the
impact of the length of the MTP reporting interval.
During the experiment, we observed that the number of people attending a particular event was
almost constant during a 10-minute time window. Therefore, we used the MTP reports to validate
all the reports sent in the following 10-minute time frame. More specifically, we validated a user
report as reliable if (i) an MTP report r was sent during the 10-minute time frame before the user
report was received, and (ii) the reported number of people in that room was in the same range as
the one sent by the MTP in r . If the number of people in the room reported by the user mismatched
the information acquired by the MTP, the report was considered unreliable. Otherwise, if no MTP
report was available during the previous 10-minute time window, we used Equation (11) to decide
whether to consider the report as reliable, as explained in Section 4.4. After the experiment, we
used the ground-truth information provided by the Bluetooth beacons and the MTPs to calculate
the classification accuracy of FIRST.
5.2.2 Experimental results. Figure 18(a) shows the distribution of the percentage of par-
ticipants that had submitted unreliable reports with a given frequency. For graphical reasons,
frequencies in the x-axis have been grouped into intervals of length 0.1. Figure 18(a) points out that
about 44% of the participants submitted more than 50% of unreliable reports; moreover, over 30% of
participants submitted more than 90% of unreliable reports when participating. These results make
this experiment ideal to study the performances of FIRST given the number of unreliable reports is
significant.
We believe that the reason why some participants reported unreliable information during the
Participatory PerCom experiment is that, at the moment of recruiting, we explained that the
experiment was part of project aimed at evaluating the robustness of a framework that improves
information quality in mobile crowdsensing. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that some
participants were motivated to purposely submit unreliable information, having as objective
providing us useful data to stress our FIRST framework and evaluate its resiliency.
Figure 18(b) illustrates the accuracy of the considered approaches as a function of the MTP
reporting intervals implemented in the experiments. These results conclude that FIRST outperforms
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Fig. 18. (a) Frequency of unreliable reports vs. percentage of participants. (b) Comparison of FIRST vs. FIDES,
Majority Vote and [Huang 2014].
existing approaches as far as classification accuracy is concerned. In particular, FIRST achieves
on the average an accuracy of 76.02%, as compared to FIDES, [Huang 2014] and majority vote
which achieve 64.45%, 63.99%, and 46.2%, respectively. The results can be explained as follows.
When the MTP reporting interval is 10 minutes, both FIDES and FIRST achieve accuracy of 100%,
because each report undergoes validation by MTPs. As the reporting interval increases, FIDES
performs worse than FIRST due to the challenge in finding a parameter setting which achieves
good performance in all scenarios. In contrast, FIRST does not require any parameter setting to be
implemented, and it is able to achieve high accuracy in all the considered scenarios.
Note that, as in the traffic sensing experiment, MTP reports were considered as normal users’
reports when evaluating Majority and [Huang 2014]. However, given the relatively small number
of MTPs involved in this experiment, the accuracy achieved by majority vote and [Huang 2014]
in Figure 18(b) does not change significantly when varying the MTP reporting interval. As far as
performance is concerned, Figure 18 concludes that such approaches do not obtain accuracy values
close to FIRST. This is due to the fact that approaches based on majority vote are not resilient to
large number of unreliable reports, which is the case of the Participatory PerCom experiments, as
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shown in Figure 18(a). It is worth noting that, even in the extreme case of MTP reporting every
40 minutes (which means that only 25% of the reports are verified, on the average) FIRST still
outperforms FIDES, Majority and [Huang 2014].
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have proposed FIRST, a novel framework that models and optimizes the information
reliability in mobile crowdsensing systems. First, we have introduced our system model, the concept
of mobile trusted participants (MTPs), and the MTP optimization problem (MOP). Then, we have
discussed in details the main components of the FIRST framework, which include a novel likelihood
estimation algorithm (LEA) and the MTP optimization algorithm (MOA) that provides optimum
solution to the MOP. Furthermore, we have extensively evaluated the framework through real
mobility traces in the context of participatory traffic sensing, and by a practical implementation of
a system that monitored participants’ attendance at the IEEE PerCom 2015 conference. Finally, we
have compared FIRST with state-of-the-art literature. Results have shown that FIRST outperforms
existing work in increasing information reliability and is able to capture the performance of the
system with significant accuracy.
As part of our ongoing work, we are currently working with the U.S. Department of Geological
Survey (USGS) to deploy IncentMe along with their National Map Corps (TNMCorps) project,
which is a U.S. government funded project tasked with mapping our Nation with crowdsourced
contributions. Since 2013, the project has expanded to include all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the
US Virgin Islands. TNMCorps volunteers are successfully editing 10 different types of structures,
including schools, hospitals, post offices, police stations and other important public buildings.
Data from selected structures, including the location and characteristics of manmade facilities are
collected by assigning “points” to the structure (i.e., locations of interest). In March 2016, the number
of data collection points reached nearly 200,000. Currently, volunteers collect and/or improve a
structure’s data by adding new points, removing obsolete points, and correcting existing data using
web-based mapping tools.
The main challenges of TNMCorps include recruiting, engaging and motivating volunteers.
The USGS believes that the addition of mobile crowdsensing to the TNMCorps project would
improve dramatically the number of points collected, and help collecting fine-grained and real-time
information to an extent which was impossible to achieve in the past. Since August 2015, we have
been closely collaborating with the USGS in Rolla, MO. Figure 19 includes a screenshot of the
prototype of the app we are developing in collaboration with USGS. The app provides an intuitive
interface for participants to update and delete points of interest from the map and retrieve points
from the server in real time. The collaboration with the USGS will provide us a platform to test the
FIRST framework and other mobile crowdsensing systems to an unprecented extent.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant no.
CNS-1545037, CNS-1545050, and DGE-1433659.
REFERENCES
[1] Hani Alzaid, Ernest Foo, Juan González Nieto, and Ejaz Ahmed. 2012. Mitigating On-Off Attacks in Reputation-based
Secure Data Aggregation for Wireless Sensor Networks. Security and Communication Networks 5, 2 (2012), 125–144.
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sec.286
[2] Raul Amici, Marco Bonola, Lorenzo Bracciale, Antonello Rabuffi, Pierpaolo Loreti, and Giuseppe Bianchi. 2014.
Performance Assessment of an Epidemic Protocol in VANET Using Real Traces. Procedia Computer Science 40 (2014),
92–99. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2014.10.035
[3] Kelsey D. Atherton. 2017. Israeli Students Spoof Waze with Fake Traffic Jam. http://tinyurl.com/p4gcgkv. (2017).
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: December 2017.
FIRST: A Framework for Optimizing InformationQuality in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems 1:33
Fig. 19. The National Map Corps App.
[4] CampusCrime. 2015. Safety on Your Smartphone for You and Your Campus. http://www.campussafeapp.com. (2015).
[5] Giuseppe Cardone, Andrea Cirri, Antonio Corradi, and Luca Foschini. 2014. The ParticipAct Mobile Crowd Sensing
Living Lab: The Testbed for Smart Cities. IEEE Communications Magazine 52, 10 (October 2014), 78–85. DOI:http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2014.6917406
[6] Giuseppe Cardone, Luca Foschini, Paolo Bellavista, Antonio Corradi, Cristian Borcea, Manoop Talasila, and Reza
Curtmola. 2013. Fostering ParticipAction in Smart Cities: a Geo-social Crowdsensing Platform. IEEE Communications
Magazine 51, 6 (June 2013), 112–119. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.2013.6525603
[7] Christiano Castelfranchi and Rino Falcone. 2010. Trust Theory: A Socio-cognitive and Computational Model. Vol. 18.
John Wiley & Sons. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470519851
[8] Younghun Chae, Lisa Cingiser DiPippo, and Yan Lindsay Sun. 2015. Trust Management for Defending On-Off Attacks.
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems 26, 4 (April 2015), 1178–1191. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
TPDS.2014.2317719
[9] Weiwei Cheng, Eyke Hüllermeier, and Krzysztof J. Dembczynski. 2010. Bayes Optimal Multilabel Classification via
Probabilistic Classifier Chains. In Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML’10).
279–286.
[10] Ellie D’Hondt, Matthias Stevens, and An Jacobs. 2013. Participatory Noise Mapping Works! An Evaluation of
Participatory Sensing as an Alternative to Standard Techniques for Environmental Monitoring. Pervasive and Mobile
Computing 9, 5 (2013), 681–694. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pmcj.2012.09.002 Special Issue on Pervasive Urban
Applications.
[11] Yi Fei Dong, Salil Kanhere, Chun Tung Chou, and Ren Ping Liu. 2011. Automatic Image Capturing and Processing for
PetrolWatch. In Proceedings of the 2011 17th IEEE International Conference on Networks (ICON ’11). IEEE, Washington,
DC, USA, 236–240. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICON.2011.6168481
[12] Akshay Dua, Nirupama Bulusu, Wu-Chang Feng, and Wen Hu. 2009. Towards Trustworthy Participatory Sensing.
In Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Conference on Hot Topics in Security (HotSec ’09). USENIX, 1–6. http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1855628.1855636
[13] E2z.com. 2017. Waze Touches 50M Users Globally; Malaysia, Indonesia in Top 10 List. http://tinyurl.com/lsounox.
(2017).
[14] Karoly Farkas, Gabor Feher, Andras Benczur, and Csaba Sidlo. 2015. Crowdsending Based Public Transport Information
Service in Smart Cities. IEEE Communications Magazine 53, 8 (August 2015), 158–165. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: December 2017.
1:34 F. Restuccia et al.
MCOM.2015.7180523
[15] OpenStreetMap Foundation. 2017. The OpenStreetMap Project. https://www.openstreetmap.org/. (2017).
[16] Peter Gilbert, Jaeyeon Jung, Kyungmin Lee, Henry Qin, Daniel Sharkey, Anmol Sheth, and Landon P. Cox. 2011.
YouProve: Authenticity and Fidelity in Mobile Sensing. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Embedded
Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys ’11). ACM, 176–189. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2070942.2070961
[17] Bin Guo, Huihui Chen, Zhiwen Yu, Xing Xie, Shenlong Huangfu, and Daqing Zhang. 2015a. FlierMeet: A Mobile
Crowdsensing System for Cross-Space Public Information Reposting, Tagging, and Sharing. IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing 14, 10 (Oct 2015), 2020–2033. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2014.2385097
[18] Bin Guo, ZhuWang, Zhiwen Yu, Yu Wang, Neil Y. Yen, Runhe Huang, and Xingshe Zhou. 2015b. Mobile Crowd Sensing
and Computing: The Review of an Emerging Human-Powered Sensing Paradigm. Comput. Surveys 48, 1, Article 7
(Aug. 2015), 31 pages. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2794400
[19] Daojing He, Sammy Chan, and Mohsen Guizani. 2015. User Privacy and Data Trustworthiness in Mobile Crowd Sensing.
IEEE Wireless Communications 22, 1 (February 2015), 28–34. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MWC.2015.7054716
[20] Kuan Lun Huang, Salil S. Kanhere, and Wen Hu. 2014. On the Need for a Reputation System in Mobile Phone Based
Sensing. Ad Hoc Networks 12 (2014), 130–149. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2011.12.002
[21] Google Inc. 2017. Google Maps APIs, Traffic Layer. https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/javascript/
examples/layer-traffic. (2017).
[22] Edwin T. Jaynes. 1957. Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics. Physical Review 106, 4 (1957), 620–630. DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.106.620
[23] Nathan Jensen. 2015. From Pastoralists to Mechanical Turks: Using the Crowd to Validate Crowdsourced Data.
http://tinyurl.com/zwbhk3w. (2015).
[24] Audun Jøsang. 1999. An Algebra for Assessing Trust in Certification Chains. In Proceedings of the Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium. 89–99.
[25] Adnan Khan, Sk Kajal Arefin Imon, and Sajal K. Das. 2015. A Novel Localization and Coverage Framework for Real-time
Participatory Urban Monitoring. Pervasive and Mobile Computing 23 (2015), 122 – 138. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
pmcj.2015.07.001
[26] Andreı˘ Nikolaevich Kolmogorov. 1950. Foundations of the Theory of Probability. Chelsea Publishing Company.
[27] Yan Liu, Bin Guo, Yang Wang, Wenle Wu, Zhiwen Yu, and Daqing Zhang. 2016. TaskMe: Multi-task Allocation in
Mobile Crowd Sensing. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous
Computing (UbiComp ’16). ACM, 403–414. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2971648.2971709
[28] LocationHolic and FakeLocation. 2011. Available respectively on AppStore (iOS) and Google Play (Android) app
markets. (2011).
[29] Tie Luo, Salil S. Kanhere, and Hwee-Pink Tan. 2014. SEW-ing a Simple Endorsement Web to Incentivize Trustworthy
Participatory Sensing. In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Annual Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications
and Networks (SECON ’14). IEEE, 636–644. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SAHCN.2014.6990404
[30] Claudio Marforio, Aurélien Francillon, and Srdjan Capkun. 2011. Application Collusion Attack on the Permission-based
Security Model and its Implications for Modern Smartphone Systems. Technical Report, Department of Computer Science,
ETH Zurich Zürich, Switzerland. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006936208
[31] Afra J. Mashhadi and Licia Capra. 2011. Quality Control for Real-time Ubiquitous Crowdsourcing. In Proceedings of the
2nd International Workshop on Ubiquitous Crowdsouring (UbiCrowd ’11). ACM, 5–8. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
2030100.2030103
[32] Elizabeth A. McCartney, Kari J. Craun, Erin Korris, David A. Brostuen, and Laurence R. Moore. 2015. Crowdsourcing
The National Map. Cartography and Geographic Information Science 42, sup1 (2015), 54–57. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/15230406.2015.1059187
[33] Chuishi Meng, Wenjun Jiang, Yaliang Li, Jing Gao, Lu Su, Hu Ding, and Yun Cheng. 2015. Truth Discovery on Crowd
Sensing of Correlated Entities. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems
(SenSys ’15). ACM, 169–182. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2809695.2809715
[34] ChenglinMiao,Wenjun Jiang, Lu Su, Yaliang Li, Suxin Guo, ZhanQin, Houping Xiao, Jing Gao, and Kui Ren. 2015. Cloud-
Enabled Privacy-Preserving Truth Discovery in Crowd Sensing Systems. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on
Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys ’15). ACM, 183–196. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2809695.2809719
[35] Hayam Mousa, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, Omar Hasan, Osama Younes, Mohiy Hadhoud, and Lionel Brunie. 2015. Trust
Management and Reputation Systems in Mobile Participatory Sensing Applications: A Survey. Computer Networks 90
(2015), 49–73. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.07.011
[36] Sarfraz Nawaz, Christos Efstratiou, and Cecilia Mascolo. 2013. ParkSense: A Smartphone Based Sensing System for
On-street Parking. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing & Networking
(MobiCom ’13). ACM, 75–86. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2500423.2500438
[37] L. F. Perrone and S. C. Nelson. 2006. A Study of On-Off Attack Models for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: December 2017.
FIRST: A Framework for Optimizing InformationQuality in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems 1:35
of the 1st Workshop on Operator-Assisted (Wireless Mesh) Community Networks. 1–10. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
WOACN.2006.337180
[38] Michal Piorkowski, Natasa Sarafijanovoc-Djukic, and Matthias Grossglauser. 2009. A Parsimonious Model of Mobile
Partitioned Networks with Clustering. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on COMmunication Systems
and NETworkS (COMSNETS ’09). DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/COMSNETS.2009.4808865
[39] Rajib Rana, Chun Tung Chou, Nirupama Bulusu, Salil Kanhere, and Wen Hu. 2015. Ear-Phone: A Context-Aware Noise
Mapping Using Smart Phones. Pervasive and Mobile Computing 17 (2015), 1–22. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pmcj.
2014.02.001
[40] Francesco Restuccia and Sajal K. Das. 2014. FIDES: A Trust-based Framework for Secure User Incentivization in
Participatory Sensing. In Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Symposium on A World of Wireless, Mobile and
Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM ’14). IEEE, 1–10. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/WoWMoM.2014.6918972
[41] Francesco Restuccia, Nirnay Ghosh, Shameek Bhattacharjee, Sajal K. Das, and Tommaso Melodia. 2017. Quality of
Information in Mobile Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges. To appear in the ACM Transactions on Sensor
Networks (TOSN). Preliminary version available as arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.03583 (2017).
[42] Stefan Saroiu andAlecWolman. 2010. I Am a Sensor, and I Approve ThisMessage. In Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on
Mobile Computing Systems & Applications (HotMobile ’10). ACM, 37–42. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1734583.1734593
[43] Yoshitaka Ueyama, Morihiko Tamai, Yutaka Arakawa, and Keiichi Yasumoto. 2014. Gamification-based Incentive
Mechanism for Participatory Sensing. In Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing
and CommunicationWorkshops (PerCom ’14Workshops). 98–103. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/PerComW.2014.6815172
[44] Xinlei Wang, Wei Cheng, Prasant Mohapatra, and Tarek Abdelzaher. 2014. Enabling Reputation and Trust in Privacy-
Preserving Mobile Sensing. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 13, 12 (2014), 2777–2790. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.
1109/TMC.2013.150
[45] Xinlei Wang, K. Govindan, and P. Mohapatra. 2011. Collusion-resilient Quality of Information Evaluation Based on
Information Provenance. In Proceedings of the 8th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference onSensor, Mesh and
Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON). 395–403. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SAHCN.2011.5984923
[46] Waze. 2017. The Waze Traffic Monitoring Application. http://www.waze.com. (2017).
[47] Haoyi Xiong, Daqing Zhang, Guanling Chen, Leye Wang, and Vincent Gauthier. 2015. CrowdTasker: Maximizing
Coverage Quality in Piggyback Crowdsensing under Budget Constraint. In Proceedings of the 13th IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communication (PerCom ’15). 55–62. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/PERCOM.
2015.7146509
[48] Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Xi Fang, and Jian Tang. 2012. Crowdsourcing to Smartphones: Incentive Mechanism Design
for Mobile Phone Sensing. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and
Networking (MobiCom ’12). ACM, 173–184. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2348543.2348567
[49] Jing Yuan, Yu Zheng, Xing Xie, and Guangzhong Sun. 2013. T-Drive: Enhancing Driving Directions with Taxi
Drivers’ Intelligence. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 25, 1 (Jan 2013), 220–232. DOI:http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1109/TKDE.2011.200
[50] Daqing Zhang, Haoyi Xiong, Leye Wang, and Guanling Chen. 2014. CrowdRecruiter: Selecting Participants for
Piggyback Crowdsensing Under Probabilistic Coverage Constraint. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp ’14). ACM, 703–714. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/
2632048.2632059
[51] Maotian Zhang, Panlong Yang, Chang Tian, Shaojie Tang, Xiaofeng Gao, Baowei Wang, and Fu Xiao. 2016. Quality-
Aware Sensing Coverage in Budget-Constrained Mobile Crowdsensing Networks. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology 65, 9 (Sept 2016), 7698–7707. DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TVT.2015.2490679
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: December 2017.
